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All parties, plaintiff general contractor and defendants

All parties, plaintiff general contractor and defendants

All parties, plaintiff general contractor and defendants, architect and city, sought review for a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), which ruled in favor of plaintiff. The parties claimed damages in connection with concrete mixing problems during construction of a public works project.

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Overview

In a dispute between plaintiff general contractor and defendants, architect and city, for damages in connection with concrete mixing problems during construction of a public works project, the court held that a four-year statute of limitations applied for the recovery of damages from any person performing or furnishing the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, so the trial court was correct in its determination that the cause of action against defendant architect was not barred. The court found that the trial court did not err when it struck the jury’s award of prejudgment interest against defendant architect. Defendant city’s liability to plaintiff was predicated on breach of contract between them. The court confirmed that no acts were alleged or proved indicating that defendant city made defendant architect perform in a negligent manner or prevented proper performance; the acts constituting estoppel were part of a course of conduct separate and distinct from conduct related to the contract between them. The judgment was affirmed.

Outcome

The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. Plaintiff general contractor was to bear its own costs. Defendant architect was to bear his own costs and the costs of defendant city. The action against defendant architect was not barred since a four-year rather than a two-year statute of limitations applied. The acts constituting estoppel were part of a separate course of conduct.

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